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TWENTY YEARS IN TAHOE-SiERRA - WHY IT'S RIGHT AND
WHY IT'S NOT A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION
INTRODUCTION'
Regulatory takings have troubled courts and stakeholders for years.
As environmental awareness grows, so does the complexity of regulation
involved in developing large tracts of land sensitive to environmental
damage. Take future home sites near Lake Tahoe. Literally.
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency,2 the United States Supreme Court tried to settle the debate
raised by its recent pro-property rights decisions favoring categorical,
bright-line rules over ad hoc, factual inquiries.3 The Court's decision,
read in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit decision it affirmed, neatly fits
recent categorical rules into the ad hoc framework by viewing them as
exceptions to the ad hoc approach, which requires a balancing of gov-
ernment and private interests.4 The rationale behind the Court's recent
decisions employing categorical rules was that one factor weighed so
dominantly that further analysis under an ad hoc framework became un-
necessary.5 This approach is in the best interests of all stakeholders be-
cause it preserves the feasibility of the planning process, while still rec-
ognizing that some temporary regulatory actions result in takings. The
categorical approach averred by landowners would make planning too
expensive and encourage uncontrolled development at the expense of
priceless natural resources.
1. A few definitions may help the reader understand this discussion. A regulatory taking is
similar to physical taking of property by the government when it exercises eminent domain in
situations such as purchasing land to construct a highway. Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation for
Permanent Takings of Temporal Interests, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 485, 489-90 (2001). A regulatory taking
arises when governmental regulation so limits the owner's use that the property is effectively taken.
See id. The government must compensate the owner for a taking. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. A per
se taking is a physical occupation of the property, while a categorical taking occurs when a property
owner is deprived of all economically beneficial use of the property. Wendie L. Kellington, New
Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, SG021 ALI-ABA 511,513 (2001). A facial taking is a
regulation so intrusive that its mere enactment creates a taking. Id. at 514. An as applied taking
arises when a regulation as applied creates a taking. Id. An as applied taking requires a factual
examination. Id. at 514-15. Afacial taking does not-the court analyzes the regulation "on its face."
Id. at 514.
2. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a categorical
taking will be found where a property owner is deprived of all economically beneficial use of the
property).
4. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 772-73 (9th Cir. 2000); see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017, 1019.
5. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483; Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 772-73; see Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1017, 1019.
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Still, despite its doctrinal soundness, the result for the landowners
involved was hardly fair or just because the regulations at issue perma-
nently deprived some of them of the opportunity to build "on land upon
which ... construction was authorized when purchased."6 Furthermore,
the decision raises troubling issues for older or poorer landowners, who
are faced with government regulations that keep them, however tempo-
rarily, from using their land as they intended. The time and cost spent
litigating these disputes is draining for all stakeholders, and is a particu-
lar hardship for individual landowners, because the factual emphasis
required by the ad hoc approach is inherently more expensive. All in all,
the various stakeholders involved in land use controversies should strive
for more proactive, cost-effective solutions, if only for the sake of avoid-
ing the pain of litigation.
Part I of this comment looks at the pertinent facts of the case and the
various moratoria enacted over the years that eventually gave rise to the
taking claims presented by the Landowners. Part II discusses the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence and provides an in-depth look at the
cases relied upon by the district court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme
Court as Tahoe-Sierra worked its way up the appellate ladder. Part Il
surveys the intricate procedural history of the case, which spanned well
over a decade and a-half from the date of initial filing. Part IV of the
comment addresses the Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra, and discusses
the reasoning promulgated by the majority for its holding. This section
also discusses the concerns raised by the two dissents filed in the case.
Finally, Part V analyzes the effects the decision will have at both ends of
the spectrum-for both landowners and government planners alike.
I. FACTS
The relevant facts of this case were undisputed.7 Lake Tahoe's wa-
ters have historically been among the world's clearest, exceeded only by
Crater Lake in Oregon and Lake Baikal in the former Soviet Union.8
Mark Twain said of Lake Tahoe: "So singularly clear was the water, that
where it was only twenty or thirty feet deep the bottom was so perfectly
distinct that the boat seemed floating in the air! Yes, where it was even
eighty feet deep." 9 The lack of algae-nourishing nitrogen and phospho-
rous in the water discouraged algae growth, which in turn created the
lake's historic clarity.10
6. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1471 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 91-510, at 3-4 (1969)).
9. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1230 (D. Nev. 1999) (quoting SAMUEL LONGHORNE CLEMENS, ROUGHING IT 174-75 (Hartford,
Americana Publ'g Co. 1891, available at http://www.digital.library.upenn.edu/books).
10. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471.
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Unfortunately, as Justice Stevens observed, "[t]he lake's unsur-
passed beauty, it seems, is the wellspring of its undoing."' 1 The beauty of
the lake and its surroundings understandably attracted development, re-
sulting in rapid deterioration of the lake's waters from nutrient-rich run-
off that reduced water clarity and promoted algae growth.' 2 Development
has increasingly covered the area surrounding Lake Tahoe with impervi-
ous materials, such as buildings, asphalt, and concrete, which prevent
precipitation from being absorbed by soil.' 3 Water flowing from drive-
ways or roofs has more "erosive force" than rain or snow falling over a
wide area covered with vegetation.' 4 Accordingly, the resulting heavier
runoff carries more nutrient-rich topsoil into the lake.15
The dramatic decrease in Lake Tahoe's clarity first attracted notice
when serious development began in the 1950s and early 1960s. 16 And
today, algae growth decreases the lake's clarity by at least a foot per
year; and if the lake turns green, its blue clarity could take over 700 hun-
dred years to return, if ever.17 The obvious solution was to restrict devel-
opment. 18
Development-exacerbated erosion particularly affects "high hazard"
areas that include steeply sloped lands, as well as areas near streams and
wetlands that ordinarily filter out nutrient-rich topsoil before it reaches
the lake.19 Thus, development restrictions particularly targeted these
"high hazard" areas.
20
Following a surge in attention to "developing environmental prob-
lems at the lake" during the 1960s, the legislatures of California and Ne-
vada approved the bi-state Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in 1969
("1969 Compact"). 21 The 1969 Compact in turn led to the creation of the
Tahoe Regional Planning Authority ("TRPA"), an administrative agency
charged with coordinating the development and preservation of the area
around the lake, including land under the jurisdiction of California, Ne-
vada, and the U.S. Forest Service. 22 Unfortunately, the failure of the
1969 Compact to substantially limit residential development or abate
11. Id.
12. Id.









22. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471-72.
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environmental decline led to dissatisfaction with the TRPA's efforts. 23
This dissatisfaction eventually prompted California and Nevada, with the
approval of Congress and the President, to adopt the 1980 Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Compact ("1980 Compact").
24
The 1980 Compact required the TRPA to create a comprehensive
regional development plan by June 19, 1983.5 Specifically, the 1980
Compact required the TRPA to adopt "environmental threshold carrying
capacities" by June 19, 1982, as a first stage, and a comprehensive de-
velopment plan twelve months later.26 Furthermore, the 1980 Compact
provided for temporary development restrictions until the enactment of
the regional plan.27 Accordingly, effective August 24, 1981, the TRPA
essentially prohibited development on high hazard areas until the TRPA
created a new plan.28
The TRPA failed to adopt carrying capacities until August 26, 1982,
two months past the scheduled deadline.29 "Under a liberal reading of the
Compact, TRPA then had one year from the adoption of the thresholds in
which to adopt a new regional plan - or until August 26, 1983. " "3 How-
ever, the TRPA failed to meet the August 26, 1983 deadline, and, wor-
ried that this failure deprived it of jurisdiction to issue permits, sus-
pended all permit issuance for ninety days.3' Unfortunately, on Novem-
ber 17, 1983, the TRPA still lacked a regional development plan, and
therefore extended the moratorium indefinitely until it finalized a plan.32
The TRPA finally adopted a new regional development plan on April 26,
1984 ("1984 Plan"). 33 Thus, the TRPA effectively prohibited all land-
owners from developing their holdings from August 26, 1983, through
April 26, 1984 (approximately eight months), and prohibited develop-
ment for owners of tracts in high hazard areas (the "Landowners") from
August 24, 1981, through April 26, 1984 (approximately thirty-two
months).34
23. Id. at 1472 (commenting that California became so dissatisfied, it withdrew its funding of
the TRPA and began its own regulatory efforts).
24. Id.; see Tahoe Regional Planning Compact of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233
(1980); Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West 2002); NEV. REV.
STAT. 277.200 (1980).
25. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1472.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233-34.
29. Id. at 1235.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1235-36 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
33. Id. at 1236.
34. Id.
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Unfortunately, the story does not end here. The 1984 Plan extended
the moratorium on building in high hazard areas until the TRPA finalized
certain provisions of the plan.35 Furthermore, the TRPA failed to clarify
36whether the moratoria's continuance would be temporary or permanent.
Almost simultaneously, California filed suit to block implementation of
the long awaited plan on the very day of its enactment.37 An injunction
was issued against TRPA prohibiting the issuance of any permits, which
lasted until the July 1, 1987 implementation of yet another plan ("1987
Plan").38 Thus, as either a direct or indirect result of the TRPA's actions,
some Landowners could not build on their tracts for over six years.
Moreover, the 1987 Plan permanently banned development of some high
hazard areas.39
II. BACKGROUND: REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
The Takings Clause of the Constitution has generated voluminous
litigation as the courts have struggled to determine just when a regulatory
taking requiring compensation arises. 4° In recent years, the United States
Supreme Court has adjudicated several regulatory takings claims that
have generated considerable controversy.41 Recent cases appeared to
have shifted the test from a fact-specific, ad hoc approach to categorical,
"bright-line" rules.
42
The right to compensation for governmental taking of property
originates in the Bill of Rights.43 The Fifth Amendment reads, in relevant
part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. '"44 Early cases originally focused on property appropria-
tion through physical seizure or through rendering it physically useless,
45





38. Id. at 1236-37.
39. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 729 (1997) (noting that the
1987 Plan's new development suitability evaluation system scored certain high hazard areas a
suitability score of zero).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; cases cited infra notes 47, 60, 67, 85, 91, 96.
41. See cases cited infra notes 47, 60,67, 85, 91,96.
42. Anthony Saul Alperin, The "Takings" Clause: When Does Regulation "Go Too Far"?, 31
S.W. U. L. REV. 169, 197-99 (2002).
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. Id.
45. Alperin, supra note 42, at 169.
46. Eagle, supra note 1, at 487.
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The concept of regulatory takings arose early this century in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.47 In Pennsylvania Coal, Mahon owned a
home constructed upon land for which he held the surface rights.4 8 Penn-
sylvania Coal Company, however, held the mineral rights and wished to
extract the underground coal.49 Mahon opposed the coal removal, claim-
ing the extraction would cause his land and home to collapse.50 Mahon
argued, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, that a Pennsylvania
statute prohibiting the coal removal was a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power.51 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, hold-
ing that the statute was not a legitimate exercise of police power.5 2 The
Court stated that the statute made it "commercially impracticable" to
mine the coal under Mahon's property, effectively appropriating the coal
and Pennsylvania Coal Company's property rights.5 The Court reversed
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, finding in favor of Pennsylvania Coal
Company. 4 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, reasoned:
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing .... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.
55
Thus, the doctrine of regulatory takings was born.
Conversely, the Court also recognized the existence and validity of
situations justifying the diminution of property interests without
compensation:
Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law .... When [diminution] reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of emi-
nent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question de-
pends upon the particular facts.
5 6
47. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that "if a regulation goes too far, it will be recognized
as a taking").




52. Id. at 414.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 416 (requiring the State to compensate Pennsylvania Coal Co. for its inability to
exercise its property rights).
55. Id. at 415-16.
56. Id. at 413.
[Vol. 80:1
TWENTY YEARS IN TAHOE-SIERRA
These comments seemingly set the stage for the ad hoc rule ultimately
endorsed by the Court in Tahoe-Sierra.
57
Before turning to Tahoe-Sierra, however, it is necessary to examine
the major regulatory takings cases following Pennsylvania Coal. Penn-
sylvania Coal involved what was effectively a permanent regulatory tak-
ing of a mining company's entire interest in a given property." While the
Court recognized regulatory takings and implied an ad hoc approach to
determine whether a taking had occurred,59 it did not prescribe a test to
guide future regulatory takings cases. Such practical guidance did not
come until 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York.6°
In Penn Central, the Court held that New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law, which prevented construction of a building atop Grand
Central Station, did not affect a taking.6' The Court outlined three factors
to weigh in determining whether a regulatory taking occurs: (1) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which
regulation has interfered with the claimant's investment-backed expecta-
tions;62 and (3) the character of the government's action. 63 While the first
factor is relatively self-explanatory, the other two require further exami-
nation.
The Court defined the second factor-a regulation's interference
with a landowner's investment-backed expectations-as economic harm
to the landowner's interests to the extent that those interests no longer
constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes, taking into account
the foreseeable limitations on the landowner's use.64 Restated, the in-
quiry turns on the landowner's reasonable expectations, including limita-
tions, for using the property at the time of investment.65 As for the third
factor-the character of government actions-the Court noted that regu-
lations promoting "health, safety, morals or general welfare" generally
do not constitute takings.66
Two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon,67 the Court again fa-
vored an ad hoc approach over a categorical rule for deciding what con-
stituted a regulatory taking.68 In Agins, the purchasers of unimproved
57. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1483
(2002).
58. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
59. Id. at 413.
60. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
61. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-17, 119, 138.
62. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
63. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
64. Id. at 124-25.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 125 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
67. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
68. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
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tracts, intending to use them for residential development, claimed that the
city effectively took their property when it rezoned the area to restrict use
to primarily single-family homes and open space.69 Relying on Penn
Central, the Court found that the rezoning substantially advanced legiti-
mate state interests,70 which pertains to the third Penn Central factor-
the character of the government regulation. 71 The Court, addressing the
first Penn Central factor-the economic impact on the landowner 7E- -
said that to qualify as a taking, the owner must lose all economic use of
the land.73 The Court noted that the rezoning still allowed the landowners
to build as many as five single-family residences on the tract, implying
that only total elimination, rather than mere diminution, of value consti-
tuted a taking.74 Finally, the Court found that the landowners were "free
to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a de-
velopment plan to local officials.
' 75
Agins introduced several issues that the Tahoe-Sierra Court faced.
First, Agins involved a challenge to the mere enactment of a regulation,
or a facial challenge, rather than an as applied challenge, because the
landowners' failure to seek a development permit prevented the Court
from evaluating whether the rezoning, as applied, worked a taking.76
Second, the Court appeared to apply a strict, complete-elimination-of-
value threshold to the economic impact factor.77 Third, the Court implied
that to effect a taking, the interference with an owner's reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations must be total and permanent.78 Fourth,
Agins reintroduced the concept of "reciprocity of advantage, ' 79 first
found in Pennsylvania Coal,80 on which the Tahoe-Sierra Court would
rely in justifying a fact based inquiry.81 "Reciprocity of advantage" oc-
curs when all property owners affected by a regulation suffer the same ill
82effects, a fact weighing against finding a taking of a single property.
69. Id. at 257-58, 262.
70. Id. at 261.
71. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. 256).
72. Id. (citing Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594).
73. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 262.
76. Id. at 259-60 (citing Socialist Labor Party v. Gillian, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972); Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)).
77. See id. at 260, 262.
78. See id. at 262-63.
79. See id. at 262.
80. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
81. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
82. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
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Finally, the Agins Court cited the "justice and fairness" principles 83 that
served as a basis for the Tahoe-Sierra Court's decision.84
Whereas Agins involved a facial challenge to a permanent regula-
tion resulting in diminution of land value, the Court's decision in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles85 ad-
dressed the question of whether a subsequently invalidated permanent
land use prohibition required compensation to landowners who were
totally deprived of usage while the regulation was in force. In First Eng-
lish, Los Angeles County permanently prohibited a church from rebuild-
ing its children's camp after a flood.86 The church challenged the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's earlier decision in Agins, which limited the regu-
latory taking remedy to mere invalidation of the regulation.87 The First
English Court held that if the regulation deprived the landowner of all
use of its property, resulting in a taking, mere invalidation of the regula-
tion provided a constitutionally insufficient remedy-just compensation
88must be paid for the taking. Justice Stevens' dissent challenged, among
other things, the Court's conclusion that regulations "which would con-
stitute takings if allowed to remain in effect permanently, necessarily
also constitute takings if they are in effect for only a limited period of
time.
'89
The Court, having implied in First English that a permanent devel-
opment moratorium effects a taking only if it totally deprives a land-
owner of all economic use,90 formalized this rule in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council.91 The landowner, Lucas, paid $925,000 for two
residential lots on the South Carolina coast, only to have South Carolina
permanently ban construction of any structure on coastal land two years
later.92 During the appeals process, South Carolina authorized exceptions
to the ban, which would have effectively removed any regulatory bar to
Lucas' development plans, had he applied for a permit.93 The Court held
that when a state enacts a regulation permanently depriving the land-
owner of all economically beneficial use, the state only avoids compen-
83. Id. at 262-63.
84. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
85. 482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987).
86. First English, 482 U.S. at 306-07.
87. Id.; see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 31 (Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255, 258-59, 263 (1980) (finding no taking on the merits and therefore declining to reach the
remedial question).
88. First English, 482 U.S. at 321-22.
89. Id. at 322, 328-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 321.
91. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
92. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
93. Id. at 1010-11.
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sation if the landowner's title does not encompass the proscribed use.94
This ruling implicated the investment-backed expectation factor by refer-
ring to limitations on the owner's title.95
In 2001, the Court delivered a complex decision in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island.9 6 Palazzolo owned property composed largely of coastal
wetlands, to which he acquired title when the corporation that owned the
property had its charter revoked in 1978.97 Palazzolo happened to be the
corporation's sole shareholder.98 Unfortunately for Palazzolo, Rhode
Island proscribed development in coastal wetlands in 1971. 99 Palazzolo
did not begin his unsuccessful attempts to gain approval to develop the
property until 1983.1 0
The Court held that Palazzolo's claim was not precluded, even
though he gained title after Rhode Island passed the regulations and thus
had constructive notice of the regulations. 01 However, reasoning that the
entire parcel of land was admittedly worth $200,000, the Court rejected
Palazzolo's claim that he had lost all economic use of his property and
that his investment-backed expectations were frustrated. 0 2 Thus, because
a regulatory takings claim considers the parcel as a whole, the remaining
usage and value of the uplands portion of the tract negated the diminu-
tion of value caused by the loss of economic use of the wetlands por-
tion. 10 3 Palazzolo asserted that the uplands and wetlands portions were
distinct, arguing that he should be allowed to pursue a total deprivation
claim of the wetlands portion. 1°4 The Court, however, rejected this argu-
ment because Palazzolo did not present it in prior proceedings. 10 5
Against this checkerboard of cases came the Tahoe-Sierra case.106
Previously, the Court had distinguished regulatory takings from "normal
delays" in the planning and governmental decision making process. 0 7 In
94. Id. at 1027.
95. Id.
96. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).




101. Id. at 628.
102. Id. at 630-31.
103. Id. at 631.
104. Id. Palazzolo's argument foreshadows the segmentation argument discussed later in this
comment.
105. Id. at 631-32.
106. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
107. See, e.g., First English, 482 U.S. at 321 ("We limit our holding to the facts presented, and
of course do not deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays
in obtaining building permits ... ").
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Tahoe-Sierra, however, the Court faced a thirty-two month delay result-
ing from the governmental decision making process.10 8
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF TAHOE-SIERRA °9
This section of the comment highlights only the procedural history
of Tahoe-Sierra leading directly to the certified question addressed by
the United States Supreme Court, though the case has a long and com-
plex procedural history.' 10 One commentator remarked: "The full proce-
dural history is more than any mortal can bear. If you study it, I recom-
mend you do not attempt to operate any heavy machinery or drive a mo-
tor vehicle thereafter-it is too numbing. '
In 1984, the Landowners filed multiple suits in federal district
courts in California and Nevada, with the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada ultimately consolidating the cases. 12 The lead
plaintiff, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, along with 448 other plain-
tiffs, 113 asserted various claims, including violations of the Takings
Clause, against numerous defendants, including the TRPA, California,
and Nevada.ll4 After over fourteen years of litigation and several district
court and Ninth Circuit opinions, 1 5 the case finally went to trial in De-
108. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1470.
109. Id.
110. In addition to the district court ruling and the Ninth Circuit decision leading to the
Supreme Court's review, the following decisions emerged from this case: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 611 F. Supp. 110 (D. Nev. 1985); Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126 (D. Nev. 1986)
(dismissing all Nevada landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, No. Civ. S-84-816 EJG (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1985) (mem.); Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, No. Civ. S-84-816 EJG (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 27, 1987) (mem.) (granting summary judgment and disposing of all California landowners'
claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d
1331 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming and reversing in part Nevada landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991)
(affirming in part and reversing in part California landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 808 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Nev. 1992) (dismissing all
Nevada landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 34 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1994), amended by 42 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming in part and
reversing in part); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 992
F. Supp. 1218 (D. Nev. 1998) (barring 1987 Plan claims under Nevada and California statutes of
limitations).
111. Dwight Merriam, Tahoe-Sierra: A Takings Time Warp?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 41, 44
(2002).
112. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1236 (D. Nev. 1999), aff d in part, rev'd in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), and aff d, 122 S. Ct.
1465 (2002).
113. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1229. The lead plaintiff, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc., is itself made up of over 2,000 separate landowners. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1473.
114. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-37.
115. See cases cited supra note 110.
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cember 1998 on the narrow claim that the mere enactment of the TRPA
ordinances under the 1984 Plan effected a taking."
16
At trial, the district court analyzed the case primarily against three
United States Supreme Court precedents: Agins, 1 7 Penn Central," 8 and
Lucas.119 The district court found that the TRPA's actions substantially
advanced a legitimate state interest, and thus did not constitute a taking
under the first Agins test. 12 With respect to the second Agins test,
whether the TRPA's actions denied the Landowners economically viable
use of their property, the district court said that either the Lucas or Penn
Central test would apply, depending on the extent of the deprivation.1
2
1
That is, if the TRPA deprived the Landowners of all use, the Lucas test
applied; conversely, if the TRPA deprived the Landowners of partial use,
the Penn Central test applied. 1
22
The district court concluded that no taking took place under the
Penn Central test. 23 The Landowners' failure to introduce evidence sup-
porting diminution of value of individual tracts weighed against finding a
partial taking on the basis of economic impact. 24 The district court also
found no unreasonable interference with the Landowners' reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 25 Specifically, since the Landowners
presented no evidence of the moratoria's impact on individual Landown-
ers, the district court evaluated only the impact on the Landowners as a
group, finding that the average Landowner held a plot for twenty-five
years before development and was aware of impending development
restrictions at acquisition.' 26 Thus, a six-year delay in building could not
unreasonably interfere with the reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions of the Landowners as a group, though the district court noted that
some individual Landowners might have held their land for almost
twenty-five years when the government imposed the moratoria. 27 With
respect to the character of the regulation, because the Landowners re-
tained some property rights, such as exclusion of others, the district court
found the moratoria unequal to the virtual physical invasion necessary to
work a taking.
128
116. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
117. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
118. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
119. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
120. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-40.
121. Id. at 1240.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1241.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1240-41.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1241-42.
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The district court, however, did find that the Landowners suffered a
categorical taking under the Lucas from the interim moratoria; 129 though
not from the three-year injunction imposed after approval of the 1984
Plan.' 30 The district court found that, despite the retention of limited ac-
tual use and value, as well as a few individual sales at greatly reduced
prices, the Landowners as a group lost all economically viable use of
their properties during the 1981-1984 moratoria.131 With respect to the
loss of use after the 1984 Plan took effect, the district court found that,
even if the new plan had allowed development of high hazard areas, the
temporary restraining order and subsequent injunction still prevented
development; thus, the TRPA's actions were neither the factual nor
proximate cause of loss of use from 1984 through 1987.132 Furthermore,
the district court rejected the TRPA's affirmative defense that the mora-
toria fell under the rule set forth in First English, excepting temporary
planning moratoria as takings, because they lacked fixed termination
dates.1
33
Both parties appealed.134 The Landowners appealed the district
court's rejection of a taking for the period after the adoption of the 1984
Plan, 135 but not the district court's rejection of a partial taking under its
Penn Central analysis; in fact, the Landowners expressly disavowed that
argument on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 136 In addition, the Landowners
appealed the district court's pre-trial order dismissing their claims under
the 1987 Plan as barred by relevant California and Nevada statutes of
limitation. 137 For its part, the TRPA appealed the district court's finding
of a categorical taking under the Lucas test.
38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part. 139 The Ninth Circuit remarked that the absence
of evidence concerning the impact of the moratoria on individual Land-
owners, stemming from the parties' stipulation that no such evidence
would be presented in this facial challenge, 140 limited its examination to
the narrow issue of whether the mere enactment of the 1980 Compact
and its accompanying moratoria effected a taking.141 Consequently, the
129. Id. at 1245.
130. Id. at 1236, 1247.
131. Id. at 1243-45.
132. Id. at 1247.
133. Id. at 1250.
134. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 771 (9th
Cir. 2000).
135. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 771.
136. Id. at 773.
137. Id. at 771; see Tahoe-Sierra, 992 F. Supp. at 1229.
138. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773.
139. Id. at 789.
140. Id. at 781 n.24.
141. Id. at 773.
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Ninth Circuit limited its evaluation to the moratoria's "general scope and
dominant features," rather than its actual effects on the Landowners. 
42
The Ninth Circuit held that regulatory takings should be decided in
an ad hoc fashion, balancing the public and private interests involved
according to the Penn Central criteria. 143 The Ninth Circuit implied that
the Lucas categorical rule, requiring compensation when regulation
eliminates all beneficial use, was a variation of the Penn Central analysis
in which ad hoc balancing is unnecessary because one factor becomes
dispositive.144
Because the Landowners disavowed any arguments under a Penn
Central analysis, the Ninth Circuit focused on the contention that the
TRPA's moratoria deprived the Landowners of all economically viable
use of their land. 145 In support of this contention, the Landowners pro-
posed analyzing this alleged categorical taking by conceptually dividing
the Landowners' interests into three slices-physical, functional, and
temporal-and considering only the portion of the temporal slice falling
within the moratoria period. 146 Restated, the Landowners' argued that a
temporary development moratorium inhibits the temporal segment, effec-
tively eliminating all economic use of the property for that period."47 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that a regulatory takings
claim requires analysis of the regulation's impact on the parcel as a
whole, compared to a physical takings analysis, which allows conceptual
severance." 48 The Ninth Circuit commented that accepting temporal seg-
mentation risked "converting every temporary planning moratorium into
a categorical taking" and depriving governments of "an important land
use planning tool."'
149
The Ninth Circuit further rejected the Landowners' assertion that
the Court's holding in First English required temporal segmentation.
50
The Ninth Circuit held that First English decided only a remedial ques-
tion-whether invalidation of the moratorium, absent compensation, was
a sufficient remedy for a regulatory taking-not whether a temporary
moratorium, in and of itself, constitutes a regulatory taking.' 5' The Ninth
Circuit further commented that the temporary taking in First English
reflected not a temporary regulation or moratorium, but a permanent
142. Id. (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926)).
143. Id. at 772.
144. Id. at 773.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 774.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 774-77.
149. Id. at 777.
150. Id. at 777-78.
151. Id. at 778.
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moratorium made temporary only because it was later invalidated. 5 2 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that First English did not apply to temporary
moratoria because such moratoria are intended to be impermanent from
the beginning. 5 3 Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Landowners'
reliance on cases requiring compensation for temporary governmental
condemnation of leasehold interests as supporting conceptual temporal
severance. 154 It held that leaseholds involved physical occupation of
property by the government, and thus were inapplicable to regulatory
takings cases.
155
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the
Landowners were due compensation because the moratoria effected
categorical takings under Lucas.156 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
mere adoption of the temporary moratoria did not deprive the Landown-
ers of all value or use of their land. 157 It distinguished Lucas, stating that
the temporary nature of the moratoria preserved the present value of the
future use of the land, precluding the moratoria's interference from rising
to the level of a total deprivation of economic use under Lucas. 58 How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit conceded that a temporary moratorium, lengthy
enough to eliminate the present value of the future use of a property,
could result in a categorical taking.
59
With respect to the Landowners' assertion that the additional mora-
toria from 1984 to 1987 resulted from the 1984 Plan, and not the injunc-
tion issued by the District Court for the Eastern District of California, the
Ninth Circuit found that the injunction prevented the implementation of
the 1984 Plan, and thus the Plan could not have caused the Landowners'
damages. 60 Finally, the Ninth Circuit aff'mned the district court's dis-
missal of the Landowners' claims concerning the 1987 Plan.' 6 ' And, over
the dissent of five judges, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehear-
ing en banc.
162
152. Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,
310 (1987)).
153. Id. at 778.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 779.
156. Id. at 782.
157. Id. at 780-81.
158. Id. at 781.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 784.
161. Id. at 789.
162. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998, 998-99
(9th Cir. 2000), affd, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN TAHOE-SIERRA
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment. 163 The
Court certified the narrow question of "[w]hether the Court of Appeals
properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land development
does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution."' 64 Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion, with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer joining. 65 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, dissented. 66 Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent,
in which Justice Scalia joined.
1 67
At the Supreme Court, the Landowners again cited Lucas and First
English as support for their argument for a per se, categorical rule.' 61 In
addition, they relied on the Armstrong principle that the intent of the
Takings Clause was "to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."
' 69
Early on, the Court referred to the principle underlying its differen-
tial treatment of physical and regulatory takings cases, namely that
physical takings involve property acquisition for public use, while regu-
latory takings involve prohibition of certain private uses of property.
70
The Court noted that most land use regulations impact property values in
some way, and that "[tireating them all as per se takings would transform
government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford."'
171
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's finding that First English
addressed only the question of how to remedy a temporary regulatory
taking. 72 The Court stated that the limited remedial issue and holding of
First English was "unambiguous,' 73 and pointed out that the California
state courts decided the remedial issue after assuming a taking had been
claimed. 74 In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that, on re-
163. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1490
(2002).
164. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948, 948-49
(2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
165. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465.
166. Id. at 1490.
167. Id. at 1496.
168. Id. at 1478.
169. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
170. Id. at 1479.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1482.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,
312-13 (1987)) ("We reject appellee's suggestion that ... we must independently evaluate the
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mand, the California Court of Appeals found no taking occurred, 175 a
finding the Court declined to review.' 76 Finally, the Court said its First
English decision "implicitly rejected" the categorical approach the Land-
owners proposed. 1
77
The Court then distinguished Lucas, stating, "Certainly, our holding
that the permanent 'obliteration of the value' of a fee simple estate con-
stitutes a categorical taking does not answer the question whether a regu-
lation prohibiting any economic use of land for a 32-month period has
the same legal effect."'' 78 The Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's rejection
of temporal segmentation as a means of bringing the moratoria within the
Lucas rule:
[T]he District Court erred when it disaggregated petitioners' property
into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at issue and
then analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all economically
viable use during each period .... The starting point for the court's
analysis should have been to ask whether there was a total taking of
the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central was the proper frame-
work. 179
The Court went on to say, "Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be ren-
dered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the
property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.'
80
Turning to the Landowners' Armstrong "justice and fairness" argu-
ment that the public, not the Landowners, should bear the burden of the
moratoria, the Court addressed seven different theories under which it
might have found a categorical taking.1 8' First, compensation is required
whenever government temporarily deprives an owner of all economic
use. 82 Second, land use restrictions beyond normal permitting and zon-
ing delays are compensable. 83 Third, delays beyond a fixed time limit
should be compensable. 184 Fourth, TRPA's actions constituted a "series
of rolling moratoria" functionally equivalent to a permanent taking.
185
adequacy of the complaint and resolve the takings claim on the merits before we can reach the
remedial question.").
175. Id. (citing First English Evangelical Church v. County of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353
(1989)).
176. Id. (citing First English Evangelical Church v. County of L.A., 493 U.S. 1056, 1056
(1990)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1483 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 1483-84.
180. Id. at 1484.




185. Id. at 1484-85.
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Fifth, TRPA acted in bad faith in intentionally delaying the plan devel-
opment.1 86 Sixth, TRPA's moratoria did not "substantially advance a
legitimate state interest."'' 87 And seventh, some Landowners might have
prevailed under a Penn Central analysis had they made individual chal-
lenges to the application of the moratoria to their properties.
188
The Court rejected the first three theories because they were per se
theories already encompassed in the certified question. 189 The Court
found the last four theories unavailable for various reasons. 90 The "roll-
ing moratoria" theory was not within the Court's review order. 191 The
district court's findings of TRPA's good faith barred the bad faith the-
ory. 192 Similarly, the district court found that the moratoria advanced
legitimate state interests. 93 Finally, the Landowners specifically dis-
avowed all Penn Central arguments. 1
94
The Court also took into account the costs and effects that a cate-
gorical rule would impose on planning: "A rule that required compensa-
tion for every delay in the use of property would render routine govern-
ment processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmak-
ing [sic]. Such an important change in the law should be the product of
legislative rulemaking rather than adjudication.' ' 95 Furthermore, the
Court stated that the "interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking
[sic] by regulatory agencies"'' 96 weighed against a per se rule because
"the financial constraints of compensating property owners during a
moratorium may force officials to rush through the planning process or
to abandon the practice altogether."'' 97 The Court reasoned that a reduc-
tion in planning would cause landowners to hurriedly develop their prop-
erty before a final plan was ready, "thereby fostering inefficient and ill-
conceived growth.'
198
Though the Court rejected a per se rule, it expressly stated that it
was not the temporary nature of the moratoria that gravitated against a
186. Id. at 1485.
187. Id.








196. Id. at 1487.
197. Id. at 1487-88.
198. Id. at 1488.
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per se rule. 199 Rather, the Court concluded that the Penn Central ad hoc
approach best served the interests of "fairness and justice.
'200
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, took issue with several assumptions and conclusions by the
majority. First, the dissent believed that the 32-month period considered
by the Court was inaccurate; the correct period was approximately six
years, including the 1984-1987 injunction.20' Second, the dissent chal-
lenged the Court's distinguishing of Lucas, stating that in Lucas, the
"permanent" ban lasted nearly two years, while the instant case involved
a "temporary" ban of nearly six years.20 2 Third, the dissent worried that
government would be tempted to enact "temporary" moratoria and ex-
tend them indefinitely without having to compensate landowners.20 3 Fi-
nally, the dissent argued that the six-year moratoria clearly exceeded the
normal delays inherent in zoning decisions, and required compensation
as takings.2°
In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, ar-
gued that First English precluded the Court's apparent conclusion that
the temporary moratoria were not takings because they did not take the
parcel as a whole.20 5 Justice Thomas argued that First English settled this
matter by holding that a total deprivation of a "temporal slice" of the
property was a taking.206 Citing the Landowners' desire to build homes
for permanent, vacation, or retirement use, Justice Thomas stated that the
land's recovery of value after the moratoria were lifted was "cold com-
fort" to property owners. 20 7 Diminution of value, in his opinion, should
not determine whether a taking has occurred; it should simply determine
208the extent of compensation.
In summary, the Court's limited holding is that a fact based, ad hoc
Penn Central analysis is the appropriate measure for regulatory takings
claims involving temporary development moratoria. Because applying
this test to the Landowners claims required evidence not presented at
trial, the Landowners effectively lost for procedural reasons. Notwith-
standing the dissent, the effect of the Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra is
to preserve the ad hoc approach to regulatory takings actions laid down
in Penn Central. In declining to create a categorical rule in favor of or
199. Id. at 1486.
200. Id. at 1489.
201. Id. at 1490-91.
202. Id. at 1492.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1494-96.
205. Id. at 1496.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1496-97.
208. Id. at 1497.
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against temporary development moratoria, the Court left open the possi-
bility that, at least in some cases, such moratoria constitute takings.
V. ANALYSIS
While the decision is arguably a victory for environmentalists and
government planners, this author-torn between environmentalist lean-
ings and his own interests as a property owner-finds the injustice to the
Landowners indirectly wrought by the opinion appalling. Yet, despite its
effects on the Landowners, the decision should cause government plan-
ners to take caution because it does not say that temporary moratoria are
never takings. From a regulatory takings jurisprudential standpoint, the
decision is consistent with the Court's early decisions, as well as its re-
cent pro-property decisions. The decision is probably the correct one, in
that it safeguards the broader practical interests of environmental protec-
tion and effective planning. However, it raises two serious concerns.
First, it raises troubling cost and time issues for landowners faced with
potential regulatory takings, particularly older or poorer landowners.
Second, given the uncertain outcomes and high cost of regulatory takings
litigation for landowners, environmentalists, and government planners
alike, the stakeholders would be wise to seek more proactive and effi-
cient means of resolving land use disputes.
Some commentators assert that the case is an "important victory"
for environmentalists, putting the brakes on a "pro-property rights jug-
gernaut.' '2°9 Clearly, protecting Lake Tahoe's water clarity was a preva-
lent concern throughout the case. It would be easy, from one perspective,
to cheer for environmental groups pitted against wealthy Lake Tahoe
Landowners, whose greed and gluttonous desire to hoard the Lake's
beauty for their exclusive enjoyment may someday ruin it. However, as
demonstrated later in this analysis, this would be a simplistic view.
Others have characterized the case as a triumph for governmental
planning. John Marshall, general counsel for TRPA in the case, said that
the decision "validates sensible regional planning by implicitly rejecting
the hyperbolic rhetoric of property rights advocates .... [It] elevates the
planner's prize-community's interests-over the demands of develop-
ers to realize quick profits.",2 '0 Even the Landowners acknowledged the
necessity of good planning; they only challenged the distribution of the
costs involved.2 '
209. See David G. Savage, Hitting the Brakes-A Pro-Property Rights Juggernaut Stalls on the
Shores of Lake Tahoe, 88 A.B.A. J. 32 (2002).
210. John L. Marshall, Sweet Affirmation, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 17, 17-
18.
211. Michael M. Berger, The Shame of Planners, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 2002, at
6,7.
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For the Landowners involved, the decision forever crushed any
hope of justice because the decision to pursue a facial instead of an as
applied approach procedurally eliminated any chance of success.212 At-
torney Michael Berger, counsel for the Landowners (and the landowners
in First English) criticized the Court's decision, saying, "I dissent - and
so should you. You could be the next target, as no one is safe so long as
the Court insists on dealing with abstract propositions rather than flesh
and blood human beings. 213
If the Tahoe-Sierra Landowners were indeed everyday folks with
small tracts of land as Mr. Berger claims,214 the continued building of
huge lakeside homes by celebrities such as Michael Milken and Mike
Love of the Beach Boys,215 as well as commercial development such as
hotels,216 makes Mr. Berger's ire at the lack of compensation for Tahoe-
Sierra's purported taking understandable.
Nothing in the opinion explains how people whose land has been de
facto confiscated for more than two decades, while the Milkens of
this world get to build palatial waterfront mansions, obtained any
benefit whatever. For a decision by the so-called liberal, or progres-
sive, wing of the Court, the opinion is curiously devoid of any con-
cern for individuals. It is a lifeless, soulless bureaucratic screed, cal-
lously nullifying cherished constitutional rights of individuals who
have done nothing wrong.
217
One might say that some of the Landowners died fighting for jus-
tice. Since filing of the original suit in 1984, more than 55 Landowners
218have died.2 8 Others, especially elderly Landowners who had already
held their tracts for many years before TRPA imposed the moratoria,
found their investment-backed expectations obliterated by the Court's
decision and "will never see justice in the form of either compensation or
the construction of the[ir] long-sought homes.1219 For these Landowners,
the 1987 Plan made the moratoria permanent,22° and the district court
212. Thomas E. Roberts, A Takings Blockbuster and a Triumph for Planning, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 4.5 ("The fact that Tahoe-Sierra was a facial, as opposed to an as-
applied, claim determined the outcome.").
213. Berger, supra note 211, at 7.
214. Id. ("There were no major developers, either, just moms and pops who wanted a home for
vacation and retirement.").
215. Eric Bailey, Lake Stays Blue but Critics of Panel See Red, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2002, at
B5.
216. Id.
217. Berger, supra note 211, at 8.
218. Merriam, supra note 11, at41.
219. Id. at 48 (quoting David Breemer of the Pacific Legal Foundation).
220. Berger, supra note 211, at 7. While TRPA's 1987 Plan created "transferable development
rights" to enable such affected Landowners to trade their property for developable property, there is
suggestion that this attempted solution is lacking. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
520 U.S. 725, 728-32 (1997).
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dismissed their claims pertaining to the 1987 Plan.22 These Landowners
surely take "cold comfort" in the Court's comment that, had they as-
serted an as applied rather than a facial challenge, they might have pre-
vailed under a Penn Central analysis.
222
Despite the apparent injustice to the Landowners and Mr. Berger's
dire warning to other landowners, governmental planners should sit up
and take note because the decision does not immunize them from paying
compensation in temporary moratoria cases. The Court left open the door
for as applied challenges to temporary moratoria under Penn Central. In
a footnote, Justice Stevens wrote, "It may be true that under a Penn Cen-
tral analysis petitioners' land was taken and compensation would be
due., 223 While the Tahoe-Sierra Landowners fared poorly in this case,
government planners should be aware that property rights advocates are
unlikely to simply lick their wounds and go away. Thus, the ruling af-
fords governments no room to be slothful in creating and implementing
land use plans.
With respect to the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, the
case can be viewed as a clarification consistent with earlier precedent.
For example, the categorical approach suggested by First English, Lucas,
and Palazzolo can now be more easily characterized as mere applications
of the Penn Central balancing test. Loss of all use or all economic use of
a property is arguably economic impact on the claimant or interference
with the claimant's investment-backed expectations. 224 Similarly, the
Agins criterion of substantially advancing state interests-never an issue
in Tahoe-Sierra2 5----defines the character of the regulation relevant to a
Penn Central analysis. Thus, Tahoe-Sierra reinforces and clarifies prior
decisions in this area.
Moreover, and notwithstanding the apparent injustice done to the
Landowners, the decision is probably doctrinally correct. As the Court
commented, without the ability to temporarily suspend development,
governments could not protect us from ourselves when we build without
regard to what we destroy.226 A categorical rule making any moratorium
221. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 992 F. Supp. 1218,
1229 (D. Nev. 1998).
222. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1485
(2002).
223. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478 n.16.
224. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th
Cit. 2000) ("[Olne factor of the Penn Central test becomes dispositive.").
225. Berger, supra note 211, at 7.
226. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1488.
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outside of normal zoning-type delays a taking would harm all of us far
too much both economically and environmentally.
227
For example, assume the government enacts a six-month morato-
rium on rebuilding homes destroyed by wildfires until it can develop an
effective fire and erosion control plan. Should the government be re-
quired to compensate the homeowners for this delay? Would the gov-
ernment's extension of the delay to six years effect a taking, or did the
homeowners' investment-backed expectations necessarily include the
risk of fire and resulting safety-related rebuilding delays? There are
countless scenarios wherein a government imposes development delays
beyond the normal zoning and permitting delays. Justice Holmes' impli-
cation that compensating every regulatory delay endangers effective gov-
ernment is a valid concern strongly weighing against a categorical
rule.228
Temporary moratoria, regardless of actual length, should rise to
extraordinary invasiveness before they effect a taking. For that reason,
the ad hoc analysis endorsed in Tahoe-Sierra is probably the best meas-
ure because it allows the courts to distinguish reasonable from unreason-
able delays by analyzing specific facts.
Despite its apparent practical and doctrinal soundness, however,
Tahoe-Sierra illustrates a problem older landowners face in pursuing
regulatory takings litigation: the litigation can take so long and its out-
come can be so uncertain that, by the time the dust settles, so do they-in
their graves. In addition, landowners of any age may now face greater
difficulty and expense in litigating regulatory takings claims because an
ad hoc approach, with its emphasis on facts, discourages facial chal-
lenges.
The Tahoe-Sierra Landowners chose to mount a facial attack for
simplicity because it alleviated the need to show the effects of the mora-
toria as applied and thus simplified their task by eliminating ripeness
229
issues. In addition, given the large number of Landowners involved,
this approach avoided the difficulty of proving many similar claims un-
der the complex Penn Central test.230 Future landowners will have to
prove facts and thus incur more expense. One commentator suggests that
individual landowners suffering similar moratoria are now essentially
deprived of due process and access to the courts:
227. Id. at 1487 ("The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking [sic] by regulatory
agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that would impose such severe costs on their
deliberations.").
228. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
229. Merriam, supra note 111, at 44.
230. Id. at 48.
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More important is the immediate problem of hampering recourse to
effective judicial procedures that are so costly, complex, burdensome,
and time-consuming as to de facto deny the victims of constitutional
violations any judicial relief at all. If an aggrieved land owner must
first go through a decade of administrative proceedings, and then liti-
gation in hostile state courts, before being able to assert a ripe federal
constitutional compensation claim in federal court, then how many
land owners will be able to carry the burdens of doing so? I am hardly
the first one to suggest it, but there comes a point beyond which due
process of law is denied, not by being curtailed, but rather by forcing
plaintiffs to partake in too much of it.
23 1
Nor are landowners alone in facing high litigation costs. During all
the years of litigation, the governments involved obviously expended
substantial resources defending themselves. Given the relative closeness
of the Court's 6-3 decision, the uncertainties involved transform these
costs into an enormous gamble. Is this really the best way to resolve such
disputes? Given that some Landowners, in reality, had their property
taken from them permanently without compensation, the answer seems
clear: the stakeholders need to explore more proactive, effective, coop-
erative, and cost-efficient planning dispute resolution approaches.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court's decision provides the correct test for
weighing regulatory takings claims because it preserves the govern-
ment's ability to effectively and efficiently plan, while providing com-
pensation for extraordinary planning delays. It is also a doctrinally sound
decision that should cheer environmentalists somewhat. Nevertheless,
the decision slams the door on the Landowners involved, and raises trou-
bling questions for other landowners, especially older and poorer ones.
Landowners and government planners alike need to give serious thought
about how they deal with complex planning dilemmas. Given the poten-
tial time and money involved in litigating these cases, stakeholders
would be wise to find more creative and cost-effective ways to balance
their competing interests, if only .to avoid the kind of protracted and ex-
pensive litigation that gave birth to this decision.
Damian Arguello*
231. Gideon Kanner, Rolling the Dice with Ambrose Bierce, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.,
June 2002, at 12, 13.
* The author is a JD candidate at the University of Denver College of Law. The author
would like to express appreciation to Thomas J. Ragonetti, Adjunct Professor of Law at the
University of Denver College of Law and partner at the law firm of Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff
& Ragonetti; Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Denver College of Law;
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and J. Thomas MacDonald, partner at the law firm of Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff & Ragonetti,
for their valuable assistance during the preparation of this comment.
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